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Private Abridgment of Speech
and the State Constitutions
Inexpensive and easily utilized channels of public communication
are crucial to an effective system of freedom of expression. In recog-
nition of this fact, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amend-
ment bars governmental attempts to prohibit citizens from using
publicly held public forums for expressive activity or from canvassing
neighborhoods of private homes. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of
these holdings is threatened by the displacement of traditional pub-
licly held public forums by privately held ones, and the related growth
of privately held multiple-housing-unit residential communities. The
Supreme Court has held traditional First Amendment doctrine in-
applicable in these new contexts because they involve private rather
than governmental abridgment of speech.
This Note argues that the free speech guarantees contained in the
fifty state constitutions are the appropriate vehicles for the protec-
tion of public forum and canvassing rights from private abridgment.
These state constitutional provisions provide a right of access to pri-
vately held public forums for reasonable expressive activity and to
privately held residential communities for reasonable canvassing. Pro-
tection of speech against private abridgment under these guarantees
constitutes an important part of the trend away from exclusive reliance
on the federal Constitution to protect civil liberties.' This trend is
already quite pronounced in the criminal procedure2 and equal pro-
tection 3 fields, and is becoming equally pronounced in the area of
I. For a useful, if dated, overview of developments in this area, see Project Report:
Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. G.R.-G.L. L. Rav. 271 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Project Report].
2. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729
(1976); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975);
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
3. Compare San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(education not fundamental interest under equal protection clause of federal Constitution)
and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender not suspect classification under
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free speech and its protection. 4
The Note begins with an analysis of the impact of private abridg-
ment on the expression system. It then discusses the role of the
federal Constitution in the private abridgment context, and con-
cludes by urging an expanded role for state constitutional guaran-
tees of free speech in the protection of the public forum and can-
vassing components of the expression system.
I. The Public Forum and Canvassing Components
of the System of Freedom of Expression
The right to use public forums for expressive activity and the
right to canvass neighborhoods of private homes are essential com-
ponents of the expression system. Effective exercise of these rights,
however, is threatened by the recent rise of private abridgment of
speech.
A. The System of Freedom of Expression
An effective expression system must insure that individuals and
groups are afforded inexpensive and easily utilized channels of pub-
lic communication. 5 The Court, therefore, has held that the First
Amendment protects from governmental abridgment expressive ac-
tivity in publicly held public forums 6 and canvassing of neighbor-
equal protection clause of federal Constitution) with Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (education is fundamental interest under equal pro-
tection guarantee of California constitution) and Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (gender suspect classification under equal protection
guarantee of California constitution).
4. See, e.g., Burkoff & Adamo, Obscenity Under the Michigan Constitution: Protected
Expression? 54 MICH. ST. BAR J. 964 (1975); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State
Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533, 546-49 (1976).
5. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 286 (1970) (public as-
sembly and petitioning are vital since they are only means through which radical, un-
popular, or underprivileged individuals and groups can reach an audience).
6. The term "expressive activity" is used in this Note to denote direct communication
in public to a mass audience or particular individuals. See id. The Supreme Court began
protecting expressive activity in streets, parks, and similar open, publicly owned spaces
in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (plurality opinion) ("The privilege of a
citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views . . .
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.") A majority of the Court
adopted this approach in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413,
415-16 (1943). See also Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 315 (1968) ("streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so histori-
cally associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the
purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and abso-
lutely").
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hoods of private homes.7 Courts have condemned governmental abridg-
ment in these contexts because of the public ownership of streets,
sidewalks, and parks.8 Protection of expressive activity therein is
premised upon the importance of maintaining inexpensive communi-
cation channels,9 and the relative ease with which the problems gen-
erated by these communicative processes can be controlled.10
These twin First Amendment rights insure that individuals and
groups seeking to communicate with the public have at their disposal
two inexpensive, easily utilized, and effective channels of public com-
munication: use of publicly held forum areas for expressive activity
aimed at a mass audience, and canvassing of neighborhoods for com-
munication with persons on an individual basis. Both techniques have
been used for centuries by individuals and groups attempting to com-
municate ideas and information to the public."
B. Private Abridgment of Speech
Unfortunately, the efficacy of these channels of communication is
endangered by the modem trend toward private ownership of tra-
ditional public forums, and by the private ownership of residential
communities. Because these entities are privately held, their owners
have been held not subject to the requirements of the Court's First
Amendment public forum and canvassing holdings.' 2
7. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) (holding municipal
ordinance forbidding canvassing unconstitutional because of its importance to democratic
political system); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (striking down as un-
constitutionally vague municipal ordinance requiring canvassers to register with local
police department before canvassing).
8. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.")
9. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("[d]oor to door distribution
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"). This statement
is especially important in light of the Court's recent holdings that the First Amendment
does not require licensed broadcasters to sell advertising time to individuals, see Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), and precludes a
state from requiring newspapers to give reply space to attacked individuals, see Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
10. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) (controlling dangers
posed by door-to-door canvassing sufficiently easy so that stringent prohibition is "naked
restriction of ideas"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (controlling littering
by prosecuting citizens who litter is better than proscribing handbilling).
11. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-47 nn.6-9 (1943) (history of door-to-
door canvassing); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (pamphlets have proven most
effective in dissemination of opinion); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (tradition-
al use of streets and parks for assembly).
12. See p. 173 infra.
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1. Privately Held Public Forums
The most prominent example of this trend is the displacement as
public gathering centers of publicly held downtown trading areas
by privately held shopping centers. When the Court was developing
its First Amendment public forum jurisprudence in the 1930s and
1940s, shopping centers were relatively few in number 13 and tradi-
tional publicly held downtown trading districts served as the pre-
dominant public gathering centers for communities. By 1973, how-
ever, there were some 13,240 shopping centers in the United States.
14
It is estimated that there will be approximately 25,000 shopping cen-
ters throughout the nation by 1985.15 In short, the privately held
shopping center now serves as the public trading area for much of
metropolitan America.' 6
Moreover, these shopping centers have increasingly assumed other
functions traditionally associated with downtown business districts.
Shopping centers often include banks, restaurants, discotheques, park-
ing facilities, post offices, reference libraries, and even churches. Some
also provide facilities for lectures and industrial conferences. 17 Thus,
shopping centers have become "new downtowns," in which members
of the public may not only shop, but also stroll, sit, meet friends,
and participate in community activities as they once did in down-
town business districts.18 Indeed, many shopping center owners view
this open posture toward the public as an essential element of shrewd
business policy.19
13. Although the first shopping center was built in 1907, as late as 1950 there were
fewer than 100 shopping centers in the United States. Eagle, Shopping Center Control:
The Developer Besieged, 51 J. URB. L. 585, 586, 589 (1974).
14. SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Jan. 1973, at 27, 28-30.
15. PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Feb. 1, 1971, at 54.
16. The trading-area function is particularly important to the development of cities.
See L. MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 410-45 (1961). Interestingly, the shopping center,
having established itself as the trading area for suburbia, is now returning to the down-
town area from whose demise it originally profited. BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34.
Thus, the traditional publicly held downtown trading area now faces competition not
only from suburban shopping centers, but also nearby from privately held urban shopping
centers.
17. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1971, § I, at 58, cols. 4-5.
18. See Breckenfeld, "Downtown" Has Fled to the Suburbs, FORTUNE, Oct. 1972, at
80; cf. Friedman, No, All Shopping Centers Are Not Alike, Los ANGELES, Nov. 1979, at
242 (describing public gathering-center functions of modern shopping centers).
19. The shopping center industry has often referred to shopping centers as "the new
downtowns." SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Feb. 1972, at 52. One owner enthusiastically noted
that "by being good neighbors we can be more successful merchants." Morris, Shopping
Centers: Main Street Moves to the Mall, MANAGEMENT REVIEW, May 1969, at 48-49. To
this end, care is taken to insure that the original design of the shopping center provides
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The implications of this development for those seeking an inex-
pensive channel of communication with a mass audience are clear. In
many communities, shopping centers must be regarded as the most
viable forum in which to communicate messages to the public.20 Thus,
use of shopping centers has become a standard campaign tactic. 21
Unfortunately, many shopping center owners maintain a policy of
excluding those who seek to engage in expressive activity on the
premises.
22
2. Privately Held Residential Communities
A less prominent, but equally important, development is the growth
of the privately held multiple-housing-unit residential community.
Unlike private homes in a typical residential neighborhood setting,
individual housing units23 are connected by privately held passage-
ways-hallways, elevators, and stairwells within individual structures,
and street-like pathways and roadways running between separate struc-
for public attraction areas such as malls and community centers. V. GRUEN & L. SMITH,
SHOPPING TowNs U.S.A. 257 (1960). Additionally, shopping centers sponsor various non-
retail promotions in order to attract people to the premises. See, e.g., SHOPPING CENTER
WORLD, Dec. 1972, at 17 (details of successful shopping center promotions).
20. A United States congressional candidate in a suburban district near Detroit noted
the importance of shopping center campaigning: "Livonia [Michigan] typifies many of the
difficulties of politics in the new suburbs. For a candidate, especially an insurgent with
a limited local organization, suburbs like Livonia are virtually impregnable. There is no
real center to it, only shopping centers. Shapiro, One Who Lost, WASH. MONTHLY,
Dec. 1972, at 7, 11.
21. Id. Moreover, presidential candidates make a practice of campaigning in shopping
centers. Breckenfeld, supra note 18, at 82 (noting shopping center campaigning by 1972
presidential candidates).
22. For example, when the Supreme Court held in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), that the First Amendment required shopping center
owners to allow labor picketing on the premises, many owners were "infuriated." Wall
St. J., Feb. 20, 1969, at I, col. 6, 21, col. I. When the Court held that the First Amendment
did not require owners to allow political handbilling on the premises, see Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), they were pleased that the Court had eliminated a
"nuisance." Breckenfeld, supra note 18, at 156. Interestingly, some owners allow presi-
dential candidates to use their facilities, but not political handbillers. See Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 555 (1972) (opinion of the Court); id. at 580 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Some owners, however, do believe that "[t]he public should be permitted into
shopping centers for political purposes and political candidates should have the right to
distribute handbills. . . . We have freedom of speech at stake here." SHOPPING CENTER
WORLD, Aug. 1972, at 21, 22 (quoting Robert Bermant of National Shopping Centers).
23. The Bureau of the Census defines a housing unit as "a group of rooms or a single
room occupied or intended for occupancy as separate living quarters, that is, the occupants
do not live and eat with any other persons in the structure, and there is either (1) direct
access from the outside or through a common hall, or (2) complete kitchen facilities for
the exclusive use of the occupants." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CO1,I-
AIERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1978, at 778 [hereinafter cited as 1978
STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr]. Owner-occupied homes and renter-occupied units are functionally
indistinguishable under this definition.
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tures-rather than by publicly held streets and sidewalks. Examples of
typical privately held residential communities are rental apartment
complexes, 24 mobile home parks, 25 condominium complexes,2 10 and
planned communities. 27 This category also includes agricultural la-
bor camps28 and nursing homes.29 Although these entities have not
displaced private homes from the housing market, they do constitute
over one-third of the occupied housing units in the United States.30
Moreover, in some areas they constitute a majority of the housing
24. An apartment complex is composed of multiple housing units, connected with
each other by passageways inside a single structure. Some complexes contain multiple
structures connected by privately held pathways. One study defines apartments as "units
in structures containing three or more units." M. NEUTZE, THE SUBURBAN APARTMENT
BOOM 11 (1968) (table).
25. A mobile home park is a plot of land upon which trailer-like mobile homes are
parked. One study noted that a mobile home park "is in reality a subdivision of residential
structures and nearly always of detached dwellings." I R. NEWCOMB, MOBILE HOME PARKS
47 (1971) (Urban Land Inst., Tech. Bull. 66). In this sense, it is more like a neighborhood
of private homes than an apartment complex. Unlike a neighborhood of private homes
and like an apartment complex, however, "the park operator commonly retains owner-
ship of the land surrounding and connecting the housing units." Id. at 48.
26. Condominium complexes provide for "a system of separate ownership of individual
units in multiple-unit buildings." 4B R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 7 633.1, at 770 (1979). As
with rental apartment complexes, the passageways connecting the individual units are
privately held. Over four million Americans already live in some form of condominium
unit, and one United States Department of Housing and Urban Development study pre-
dicts that half of the population will live in condominiums over the next 20 years. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24, 1977, § C, at 14, cols. 1-6.
27. Planned communities are indistinguishable from typical residential neighborhoods,
except for the fact that the streets within them are privately held and usually can be
entered only through gatchouse entrances manned by guards. Some planned communities
are surrounded all or in part by walls. See State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super. 408, 409-10, 276
A.2d 595, 596 (Middlesex County Ct. 1971) (description of Rossmoor Community retirement
village); Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1980, § I, at 34, cols. 3-6 (advertisement for Leisure
Village).
28. The modem-day agricultural labor camp includes, in addition to farmland and
agricultural facilities, housing facilities for migrant laborers resident on the premises.
Many camp owners also provide sewage, garbage disposal, fire protection, and sometimes
even minimal shopping facilities. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co.,
574 F.2d 374, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1978) (describing 201-acre mushroom farm known as Prince
Crossing, Illinois).
29. As of 1974, there were over 16,500 nursing home facilities eligible for federal
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement, with a combined total of over one million residents.
HEW, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, OFFICE OF NURSING HOME AFFAIRS, LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITY IMPROVEIMENT STUDY, INTRODUCTORY REPORT 17-18 (1975). Unlike apartment com-
plex residents, nursing home residents receiving custodial care do not generally reside in
separate housing units. Like apartment dwellers, however, these individuals "reside in
nursing homes owned by a private party and located on private property." See Comment,
Nursing Home Access: Making the Patient Bill of Rights Work, 54 J. URB. L. 473, 493-94
(1977).
30. In the latest year for which statistics are available, 1976, renter-occupied units
accounted for 35.3% of the occupied housing units in the United States. 1978 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 23, at 792 (Table No. 1377). Most renter-occupied housing units
are in multiple-housing-unit structures. Moreover, many forms of owner-occupied housing
structurally resemble renter-occupied housing. See notes 25-27 supra.
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units.a3 This situation is unlikely to change in the near future.32
Although the owner of a privately held residential community is
generally precluded from excluding a canvasser specifically invited
by a tenant,33 the housing unit occupier must take the initiative in
inviting the canvasser to his door to speak. By contrast, in a resi-
dential neighborhood with publicly held streets and sidewalks, the
burden is on the housing unit occupier to exclude the canvasser by
posting a "No Canvassing" warning.34 Moreover, in some circum-
stances exclusion of canvassers can give the owner control over the
flow of information to persons resident on his property. Agricultural
labor camp operators, for example, frequently exclude, among oth-
ers, representatives of non-profit organizations that provide informa-
tion and services to isolated migrant laborers. 35 Similarly, nursing
home operators frequently exclude representatives of non-profit or-
ganizations that monitor nursing home conditions. 36
II. The Federal Constitution, the States, and
Private Abridgment of Speech
The displacement of the publicly held downtown trading area by
the suburban shopping center, together with the development of pri-
31. Eighty per cent of the 94,000 residents of Santa Monica, California, for example,
are tenants. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1979, § A, at 18, col. 6. When the 1970 Census was
taken, a majority of the housing units in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and New
York were renter-occupied. 1978 STATISTICAL AmSTRAcr, supra note 23, at 791 (Table No.
1376). Renter-occupied units comprised between 40% and 49.9% of the housing units in
Alaska, California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Rhode Island when
the 1970 Census was taken. Id.
32. As the median price of a new home continues to rise, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1979, § 12 (National Economic Survey), at 42, col. 1; Boston Globe, Jan. 12, 1980, at 14,
col. 1, many families will be priced out of the private housing market and will have
no choice but to rent. Moreover, much owner-occupied housing being developed struc-
turally resembles renter-occupied housing. See p. 170 & notes 25-27 supra.
33. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943) (tenants
have easement over common passageways of apartment complex, thus preventing owner
from excluding canvassers specifically invited by tenants).
34. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (dictum) (municipality
could punish only canvassers who called at homes in violation of warning posted by
homeowner).
35. In the typical case, the camp operator denies a union organizer or representative
of a public interest organization the right to communicate with the migrant workers on the
camp premises. See Note, Access to Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v. Alabama Revisited,
55 Cmr.-KNT L. rEv. 285, 292 & n.45 (1979) (collecting cases).
36. Many nursing home patients are unable to journey beyond the confines of the
nursing home. See Comment, supra note 29, at 473-74. In 1974 and 1976, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare promulgated regulations known as "patient bills of
rights" that safeguard specific interests of nursing home patients. Id. at 474. Officials of
the Department have encouraged community groups to monitor nursing home activities
in furtherance of this regulatory end. Id. at 479. Nursing home operators have resisted
such monitoring activities. Id. at 479 n.62 (collecting cases).
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vately held residential communities, indicates that changed socio-
economic circumstances have rendered the First Amendment public
forum and canvassing doctrines inadequate to insure the availability
of inexpensive and easily utilized vehicles of public communication.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment has no role
to play in this area. Unless the goal of insuring the availability of
these vehicles is to be abandoned, an alternative method of pro-
tecting these rights must be found.
37
A. The First Amendment and Private Abridgment of Speech
One approach with many adherents would simply bring private
abridgment of speech within the proscriptive ambit of the First
Amendment through use of Fourteenth Amendment "state action"
doctrine.38 Under this approach, the contemporary implications of
private abridgment would be recognized by holding that the enti-
ties discussed in this Note either performed public functions30 or
significantly involved the state in their abridgment through invocation
37. One often unnoticed virtue of these two First Amendment rights is that they give
every person at least a toehold position in the marketplace of ideas, see T. EMERSON,
supra note 5, without intruding upon the editorial autonomy goal of the system of
freedom of expression, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(state right of reply statute violates First Amendment by invading editorial autonomy).
Such an intrusion would occur if, for example, licensed broadcasters were required to
sell or even give away advertising time for messages. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126-27, 131 (1973) (leaving open possibility of
governmental requirement of access to licensed broadcasters, despite effect on broad-
casters' autonomy).
38. There is voluminous literature in this field arguing that abridgment by particular
private entities constitutes "state action." See, e.g., Comment, The Public Forum from
Marsh to Lloyd, 24 Am. U.L. REv. 159 (1974) (shopping centers); Note, Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973)
(shopping centers); Cases Noted, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 1105 (1948) (apartment complexes);
Comment, supra note 29 (nursing homes); Sherman & Levy, Free Access to Migrant Labor
Camps, 57 A.B.A.J. 434 (1971) (agricultural labor camps); Note, supra note 35 (agricultural
labor camps); Note, First Amendment and the Problem of Access to Migrant Labor Camps
After Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 560 (1976) (agricultural labor
camps).
39. The "public function" strand of state action analysis originated in Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which the Court held that a privately owned municipality
was precluded by the First Amendment from curtailing religious handbilling on the
sidewalks of its downtown trading area. Because the town had "all the characteristics of
any other American town," id. at 502, its actions were treated as governmental even
though it was wholly owned by a private corporation, id. at 508. Marsh thus insures that
states may not delegate governmental functions to private parties in order to escape
federal constitutional obligations. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv.
47, 144 (1975). However, the Marsh public function doctrine has been carefully confined
to functions exclusively performed by state governments. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 159-63 (1978).
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of state trespass statutes. 40 At one time, it appeared that this ap-
proach might protect public forum and canvassing rights from pri-
vate abridgment.
41
This development did not materialize. Because the Court has found
governmental action not to be present in the exclusion of expres-
sive activity by owners of these properties, 42 First Amendment pub-
lic forum and canvassing rights are inapplicable to a significant num-
ber of areas that attract persons interested in exercising them. Thus,
40. The "significant state involvement" strand of state action analysis originated in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in which the Court held that judicial enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants constituted state action sufficient to invoke the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 164-66 (1978) (invocation of state statute by warehouseman in order to sell goods
entrusted to him for storage not state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (Shelley doctrine limited to situations in which state had fostered or
encouraged conduct at issue). Each shopping center case decided by the Supreme Court
involved the use of trespass or similar statutes to prevent expressive activity on the
premises. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 508 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 556 (1972); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
311-12 (1968). For an argument that invocation of trespass statutes can amount to state
action, see Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Anendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 412 (1958).
41. First Amendment protection of expressive activity on private property began in
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which the Court held that a privately held
municipality could not abridge handbilling on its "business block," because the munic-
ipality performed a "public function." Id. at 502-03, 506. Its actions were thus treated
as governmental even though title to the property at issue was exclusively in the hands
of a private corporation. In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968), the Court held that the First Amendment protected peaceful picketing
within the confines of a privately held shopping center "in a manner and for a purpose
generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put." Id. at 319-20. It
analogized the modern shopping center to the "business block" in Marsh. id. at 317.
The Logan Valley analsis extended the First Amendment well beyond the Marsh "coin-
pany town" context to encompass all privately held areas that, in practice, function as
public gathering places or thoroughfares. See T. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 309. It also
furnished the basis for opening privately held residential communities to canvassers. Id.
42. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the Court rejected the application
of the First Amendment to political handbilling in a private shopping center when the
handbilling was unrelated to the commercial functions of the shopping center property.
Lloyd distinguished Logan Valley on two grounds. First, the expressive activity in Logan
Valley was directed to the labor relations policies of a shopping center tenant, 391 U.S.
at 311-12, whereas the expressive activity in Lloyd was directed to U.S. Vietnam War
policies, 407 U.S. at 556, 564-66. Second, the political handbillers in Lloyd, unlike the
labor pickets in Logan Valley, had available adequate alternative avenues of communica-
tion with shopping center patrons. 407 U.S. at 566-67. In dictum, the Lloyd Court express-
ly rejected the Logan Valley application of the First Amendment to private abridgment of
speech. 407 U.S. 551, 567 (First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard rights of free
speech by limitations on state action rather than action of private property owners). Four
years later, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court explicitly recognized that
Lloyd had overruled Logan Valley. Id. at 518 (rationale of Logan Valley did not survive
Lloyd). Accordingly, it withdrew from the private abridgment field with the statement
that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play" in this context.
Id. at 521. Although Marsh is still good law, 424 U.S. at 513-14, the Court probably has
confined it exclusively to its facts.
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this approach will not protect those rights from private abridgment.
It is clear that considerations of federalism as well as those of
constitutional interpretation have dictated the Court's withdrawal
from the private abridgment field. The Court has determined that
abridgment of speech by these entities, along with the interests of
persons in engaging in expressive activity on their properties, is
merely a part of the private ordering of property relationships in
the non-governmental world.43 These relationships have traditionally
been defined exclusively by state law, 44 and a federal judicial find-
ing of state action in these circumstances would intrude upon state-
defined property relationships in order to protect a speech interest
not found in the First Amendment.45
B. The States and Private Abridgment of Speech
As the Court withdrew from the private abridgment field, it sug-
gested that state governmental institutions fill the gap. 40 It explic-
itly left states the option of prohibiting owners of private property
that functionally replicates either traditional public forums or pub-
lic streets from excluding persons who wish to engage in reasonably
exercised expressive activity. Although the First Amendment does
not encompass this policy, the logic of the Court's withdrawal sug-
gests that states should adopt it. The First Amendment, like all pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, merely sets minimum federal standards,
and does not preclude states from providing greater protection to
expressive activity within their borders.47
43. Compare Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-60 (1978) (resolution of private
civil disputes not an exclusive function of the sovereign, thus warehouseman's proposed
sale of goods entrusted to him for storage under provisions of state statute not state
action) with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (municipal government an exclusive
function of the sovereign, thus actions of privately held municipality treated as govern-
mental).
44. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
45. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) ("[]t must be remembered
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and as-
sembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property
used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.")
46. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("while statutory or common law
may in some situations extend protection or provide redress against a private corporation
or person who seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or re-
dress is provided by the Constitution itself").
47. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489, 489-95, 498-502 (1977). The Court has recognized this point in several recent
cases. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (although obscenity
unprotected under First Amendment, states free to drop legal controls on obscenity);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (states free to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by Fourth Amendment).
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Moreover, states adopting this policy would not run afoul of any
federal constitutional guarantees accorded property owners. First, the
property owner cannot successfully raise a substantive due process
objection, because this policy would clearly be founded upon a ra-
tional basis. 48 Second, the state prohibition of private abridgment
would not amount to a "taking" requiring just compensation of the
owner under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 9
To be sure, such a policy would prevent the property owner from
excluding unwanted .persons under certain circumstances.50 The right
to exclude others is undoubtedly a fundamental element of any
property right.51 However, it is merely one element of a bundle of
property interests, and it is settled doctrine that state action that
merely deprives an owner of one element of such a bundle does not
48. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd sub nom. PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980), the California Supreme Court based its
adoption of this policy on the public forum role profitably assumed by shopping centers
in California, and the need not only to protect general speech rights, but also the sig-
nature-gathering elements of the related California constitutional rights of initiative,
referendum, recall, and general petitioning. Id. at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 858. It analogized protection of speech and petitioning to valid health, safety, and
environmental regulations. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
49. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides, in relevant part, that "private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV provides,
in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment was incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). One court has held that these provisions prevent a
state from prohibiting private abridgment of speech. In Lenrich Assoc. v. Heyda, 264
Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972), the court found that it was prevented from holding that the
free speech guarantee of the state constitution protected expressive activity in a privately
held shopping center. Id. at 127-29, 504 P.2d at 115-16 (plurality opinion). Lenrich is
premised upon dicta in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), concerning the prop-
erty rights of a shopping center owner. See id. at 552-53 (certiorari granted to consider
owner's contention that lower court decision holding that First Amendment protected
political handbilling on shopping center premises violates property owner's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment property rights); id. at 570 (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
property rights, as well as First Amendment rights, must be respected and protected).
But Lloyd ultimately held that "there has been no such dedication of Lloyd's privately
owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise
therein the asserted First Amendment rights." Id. This holding did not create any federal
property right of shopping center owners to exclude from their property persons wishing
to engage in expressive activity therein.
50. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (takings clause pre-
vents federal government from using navigational servitude power to create public right
of access to former inland pond that private developers had opened to ocean for use as
marina by fee-paying customers without paying just compensation, because such right
government sought to create would take away owner's right to exclude unwanted users
of pond).
51. See id. at 179-80 ("right to exclude" universally held to be fundamental element
of property right).
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amount to a taking.52 This is because judicial attention is inevitably
focused on the impact of a particular governmental policy on an
owner's aggregate of property interests.
53
This approach was the one taken by a unanimous Supreme Court
in upholding the adoption by California of the policy urged herein
against a "takings" challenge mounted by a shopping center owner .
The Court upheld this policy on the ground that it did not signif-
icantly impair the commercial value or use of the property.55 In-
deed, it is quite analogous to valid federal and state labor legis-
lation requiring property owners to permit union expressive activities
on their property5 6 and does not result in a "taking" requiring
compensation.
57
Finally, a state policy protecting speech against private abridg-
52. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ('[T]he denial of one traditional
property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses
a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.")
53. Id.; cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) ("not every destruction
or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense").
54. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
55. Id. at 2042 ("There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from pro-
hibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their prop-
erty as a shopping center.")
56. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-76 (1978) (National Labor Relations
Act protects employee distribution on company property of union publication substan-
tially devoted to nonorganizational political commentary); Agricultural Labor Relations
Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 411-19, 546 P.2d 687, 699-705, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183,
195-201, appeal dismissed sub nom. Kubo v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 429
U.S. 802 (1976) (California Agricultural Labor Relations Act requires farmers to grant
nonemployee union organizers access to their property for communication with employees);
cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-61 (1964) (prohibition of
racial exclusion by owners of public accommodations not a taking); id. at 277-78 (Black,
J., concurring) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not even come close to taking).
57. Nor would it infringe upon any First Amendment right of property owners to
exclude speech activities from their property. This right was asserted by the shopping
center owner in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2043-44 (1980).
It was premised upon a line of Court decisions holding that the First Amendment pro-
hibits governments from compelling individuals to convey messages. See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 247-58 (1974); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630-42 (1943). The
Court rejected application of these holdings as inapposite in a situation where the state
was merely preventing an owner from excluding individuals who wish to communicate
with those on his property rather than forcing him to convey a state-sponsored message.
See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1980). The situation
presented by state adoption of the policy urged herein is more analogous to that in
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), in which the Court made it clear that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act could constitutionally prevent the owner from abridging
labor picketing. Id. at 521-23. On remand, the NLRB held that federal labor law com-
pelled such a result. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977). This result, of course, is
quite incompatible with any asserted First Amendment right of property owners to
exclude individuals who wish to engage in expressive activity on the property.
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ment is constitutionally supported by the Court's series of holdings
that property rights are not created by the Constitution and exist
exclusively under state law.5 Thus, while the First Amendment does
not recognize a person's interest in protection against purely private
abridgment of speech, the Fifth Amendment at the same time does
not absolutely protect a private abridger of speech from state pro-
tection of reasonably exercised expressive activity on his property.
The Court's withdrawal from the private abridgment field leaves
the matter entirely in the hands of the states.
III. The State Constitutions and Private Abridgment of Speech
The considerations of federalism that have dictated the Court's
withdrawal from the private abridgment field, together with the con-
temporary impact of private abridgment on the expression system, 59
dictate that the states enter and protect persons against private abridg-
ment. This could be accomplished through injunctive relief that pre-
vents private owners of public forums and residential communities
from excluding persons who engage in reasonably exercised expres-
sive activity.
A. Sources of State Protection Against Private Abridgment
There are three possible sources of state protection against pri-
vate abridgment of speech: statutory law,°0 common law,61 and state
58. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property rights are not
created by Constitution but by independent sources such as state law); cf. Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (interest in reputation "is simply one of a number [of interests]
which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law"); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) ("A property interest in employment . . . must be decided by
reference to state law.")
59. See pp. 165-71 supra.
60. A few states have enacted legislation that prevents owners of certain types of
property from excluding those who wish to exercise rights of expression on the premises.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210A.43 (West Supp. 1979) (unlawful "for any person, either
directly or indirectly, to deny access to any apartment house, dormitory, nursing home,
mobile home park, any areas in which two or more single family dwellings are located
on private roadways or other multiple unit facility used as a residence, to any candidate
who has filed for election to public office or workers accompanied by the candidate ... ");
Cf. CL. LABOR CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1979) (limited right of access to agricultural
property granted to union organizers); CAL. DEP'T OF GENERAL SERVICES, 8 CAL. ADM. CODE
§§ 20900-20901 (1976) (same). An administrative regulation of the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare grants outsiders the right to enter nursing homes. Brown, An Appraisal
of the Nursing Home Enforcement Process, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 304, 318 n.121 (1975) (citing
4 HEALTH LIw PROJECT, U. PA. LAw SCHOOL, MATERIALS ON NURSING HoMs 185-88 (rev.
ed. 1972)). The California Legislature, however, refused to enact legislation requiring
owners of shopping centers to permit signature gathering and voter registration on the
premises. See Cal. Assembly Bill No. 649, 1977-78 Regular Session; CAL. LaGIS., 1977-1978
REGULAR SESSION, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, VOL. 1, at 461.
61. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971) (under New Jersey law
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constitutional law. Only the third, however, would effectively pro-
tect vital public forum and canvassing rights from private abridgment.
An important feature of an effective system of freedom of ex-
pression is its reliance on independent judicial institutions, rather
than elective political ones, such as legislatures, to supervise the func-
tioning, as opposed to the outcomes, of democratic process.6 2 Courts,
rather than legislatures, are relied upon to safeguard democratic
process from governmental abridgment of speech. Similarly, courts
should be relied upon to protect the democratic process from pri-
vate abridgment. Unlike reliance on statutory or common law, use
of state constitutional law would ensure effective judicial protection
of access to privately held public forums and residential communities.0 3
B. Free Speech Guarantees in State Constitutions
Every state constitution contains a free speech guarantee, but few
state courts have critically analyzed the meaning of these guaran-
tees.64 Although the First Amendment sets minimum federal speech-
protection standards, it does not prevent state courts from providing
greater speech protection under analogous guarantees in state con-
stitutions.65 Moreover, the language and history of the state con-
ownership of real property does not include Tight to bar access to governmental services
available to migrant workers resident on owner's property); Freedman v. New Jersey State
Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975) (Shack access right to agricultural labor
camps extended to members of press); cf. State v. Korich, 219 Minn. 268, 17 N.W.2d 497
(1945) (quiet and orderly canvassing in apartment complex upheld against charge of dis-
orderly conduct brought by owner). A tort law solution is proposed in Schwartz, A Land-
holder's Right to Possession of Property Versus A Citizen's Right of Free Speech: Tort
Law As A Resource For Conflict Resolution, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1976).
62. See T. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 13 ("[Tjhe judicial institutions . . . here deal
essentially with the methods of conducting the democratic process, not with the sub-
stantive results of that process. In this differentiation of function lies a generic distinction
between the role of the judiciary and the role of the legislature.")
63. Although the common law approach, see note 61 supra, initially achieves judicial
protection of speech, it leaves the legislature the option to nullify the judicial initiative
with new statutory law. This commonly occurs in state tort law. See, e.g., Evans v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 105, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (1971) (overturning doctrine of
sovereign immunity from tort liability with statement that legislature was free to restore
this doctrine if it chose to do so).
64. Most courts have simply assumed that the state guarantee was to be construed
in pari materia with the First Amendment. See, e.g., Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505,
197 A.2d 232, 235-36 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); cf. Sigma Delta
Chi v. Speaker, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 156 (1973) (freedom protected is substantially same
as that protected by First Amendment). Thus, it is not surprising that commentators have
generally ignored state constitutional guarantees of free speech. For example, none of
the articles listed in note 38, supra, discuss these provisions. Indeed, there is only one
article devoted exclusively to state constitutional guarantees of free speech. See Note,
Freedom of Expression Under State Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. Rev. 318 (1968) (discussing
only governmental abridgment of speech).
65. See note 47 supra.
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stitutional guarantees of free speech and related rights of expression 6
indicate that they provide protection for public forum and can-
vassing rights against private abridgment.
1. Affirmative Free Speech Rights in State Constitutions
The issues of private abridgment involves the relationship of prop-
erty rights of landowners with the public's interest in free speech.
The states, as regulators of property rights, 7 are the best arbiters of
any resulting conflicts. The free speech guarantees in forty-four state
constitutions create an affirmative right of free speech, unlike the
mere limitation on state action found in the First Amendment.68
The text of the California guarantee is typical: "Every person may
freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right. A law may not restrain
or abridge liberty of speech or press."69 Although the legislative his-
tory of the California free speech guarantee is silent as to whether its
framers intended to reach private abridgment, there can be little doubt
that they drafted a guarantee more protective than the First Amend-
ment.
7 0
The California Supreme Court recognized this when it held in
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center7 1 that this provision, along
66. Many states also protect the related rights of assembly and petition. See, e.g.,
CAL. CoNrT. art. I, S 3; MICH. Co~sr. art. I, § 3. Many also provide for citizen-initiated
legislation through guarantees of initiative and referendum. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II,
§§ 8-11; WASH. CoNsT. art. II, § IA. These provisions require proposals to be accompanied
by a minimum number of signatures in order to qualify for the ballot. Id. They there-
fore provide additional constitutional support for state protection of exercise of public
forum rights in privately held properties that practically function as public forums.
67. See pp. 174, 177 supra.
68. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a commonplace
that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment
by government ....")
69. CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 2.
70. The California free speech guarantee was taken from the Iowa Constitution of
1846 and placed in the first California Constitution in 1849 without debate, and has not
been significantly addressed since. Under this provision, persons in California may speak,
write, and publish freely on all subjects, subject to liability only for abuse of this af-
firmative right. Moreover, the latter limitation refers only to liability for defamation,
and is not intended to limit the scope of the affirmative speech right. Finally, the second
sentence of the California guarantee, see id., provides additional protection against gov-
ernmental abridgment. See Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26
HxVr!NGs L.J. 481, 491-96 (1974). The framers of the similarly worded Michigan free
speech guarantee, drafted in 1961, explicitly stated their intention to protect speech in-
dependently of the First Amendment. See Norris, A "'Freedom of Expression" in the New
Constitution, 31 Dr. Liw. 190, 190-91 (1963).
71. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd sub nora. PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
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with related constitutional guarantees, 72 protected expressive activ-
ity 73 in a privately owned shopping center. 74 The court held that
the property owner could subject the expressive activity only to rea-
sonable regulation, and would be constitutionally enjoined from ex-
cluding it altogether.7 5 This holding was premised entirely upon the
public forum role assumed by shopping centers in California7 3 and
not on any finding of state action behind the owner's abridgment
of speech.77 The Pruneyard court viewed the broader coverage of
the state guarantee, together with the contemporary impact of shop-
ping centers on the California political process, as sufficient to reach
private abridgment in this context.-I
The free speech guarantees in forty-three other state constitutions
are linguistically similar to the California guarantee, notably in their
provision of an affirmative right rather than simply a restraint on
state action.70 Although some courts in those states have evaded the
72. The court also rested its holding on the California constitutional guarantees of
initiative, referendum, recall, and general petitioning. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 592 P.2d at
345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
73. Appellants before the California Supreme Court in the case were high school stu-
dents who set up a cardtable in the central courtyard of a shopping center to solicit
signatures on a petition expressing opposition to a United Nations resolution labeling
Zionism as a form of racism. Id. at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
74. PruneYard Shopping Center is a privately owned, 21-acre suburban shopping
center with 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a cinema, as well as parking areas, walkways,
and plazas. Id.
75. Id. at 902, 911, 592 P.2d at 342, 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855, 860-61. The trial
court in Lenrich Assoc. v. Heyda, Civil No. 373-433 (Cir. Ct. Multnomah County, Or.,
Mar. 23, 1972), rev'd, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972), issued a similar injunction. See
Recent Cases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1592, 1593 n.2 (1973).
76. The court cited statistical evidence of the decline in retail sales activity in down-
town trading districts, together with the rapid growth in shopping center retail sales, to
"dramatize the potential impact of the public forums sought here." 23 Cal. 3d at 907,
592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858. It concluded by noting that thousands of persons
"[a]s a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment ... are induced to
congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the ... [shop-
ping center]." Id. at 910-11, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
77. Rather, the court simply noted that "the public interest in peaceful speech out-
weighs the desire of property owners for control over their property." Id. at 909, 592 P.2d
at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
78. The court, after quoting the language of the state free speech guarantee, noted
that "[t]hough the framers [of the California guarantee] could have adopted the words
of the federal Bill of Rights they chose not to do so. . . . Special protections thus ac-
corded speech are marked in this court's opinions. Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13
Cal. 3d 652, 658, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472, 532 P.2d 116, 120, for instance noted that '[a]
protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is the right
of free speech and press.'" Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
79. See ALA. CONsT. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONsr. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 6;
ARK. CONST. art. 1I, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONSr.
art. I, § 4; GA. CoNsT. art. I, § 1, para. 4; IDAHO COtsT. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 4;
IOWA CONsT. art. I, § 7; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 11; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 8; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 7; MF. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. DECL. OF RIGHT'S, art. 40; MAsS. CONsr. art. 77;
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private abridgment issue by assuming uncritically that the state guar-
antee at issue must be construed in pari materia with the First Amend-
ment,80 a few have used state guarantees to reach private abridg-
ment of speech. For example, in Freedman v. New Jersey State
Police,8' the New Jersey Superior Court held that since the free
speech guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution was linguistically
broader than the First Amendment, 2 the owner of an agricultural
labor camp would be prohibited from excluding members of the
press who wished to communicate with workers residing on his
property.8 3 Similarly, when an evenly divided Michigan Supreme
Court upheld handbilling in shopping centers in Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., s4 the four jus-
tices who voted in favor of expressive activity on the premises based
their holding partially on the linguistically broader free speech guar-
antee in the state constitution. 5 Finally, the Washington Court of
MIcH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 3; MIss. CONs'r. art. III, § 13; Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 5; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H.
CoNsT. Part I, art. 22d; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §
5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 13; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 5; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 20; cf. DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
Although the text of the Delaware provision protects only press freedom, the Delaware
courts have construed it to protect speech as well. See State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1969).
80. Thus, the highest courts of New York and Virginia have upheld the exclusion of
canvassers from apartment complexes on the grounds that governmental abridgment was
not present in this context. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948); Hall v. Commonwealth,
188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875 (1948). Although plaintiffs raised
the state guarantees as an issue in each case, see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. at 345, 79 N.E.2d at 435; Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va.
at 73, 49 S.E.2d at 370, neither court attempted to construe them independently of the
First Amendment. Had they done so, they might have seen the real issue present in both
cases: erosion of the canvassing right through private ownership of passageways connect-
ing multiple housing units. Cf. State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So. 2d 377 (1941) (uphold-
ing exclusion of canvasser by plantation owner). In a recent libel case, however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated in dictum that it could protect speech independently of
the First Amendment. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 891-92 (La. 1977).
81. 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975).
82. The court initially invoked State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). 135
N.J. Super. at 299, 343 A.2d at 150. It then extended the Shack access right to members
of the press on the basis of its interpretation of Art. I, § 6 of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion. Id. at 301, 343 A.2d at 151. In doing so, it referred to the provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution's declaration of rights, including presumably the free speech guar-
antee, as "provid[ing] greater protection to individual rights and liberties than the federal
[Constitution]." Id. at 300, 343 A.2d at 150.
83. 135 N.J. Super. at 301, 343 A.2d at 151.
84. 370 Mich. 547, 563-74, 122 N.W.2d 785, 793-99 (1963) (opinion of Black and Smith,
JJ., with Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurring) (upholding lower court injunction pro-
tecting handbilling from abridgment by shopping center).
85. Id. at 563 n.2, 122 N.W.2d at 793 n.1 (1963).
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Appeals used a similar approach to uphold signature gathering on
shopping center property in Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping
Center.8 6
2. Toward an Expanded Concept of State Action
Under State Constitutions
The free speech guarantees in six state constitutions, by their
terms, require some showing of governmental abridgment in order
to be invoked.8 7 Nonetheless, in those states the principles of fed-
eralism and the requirements of an effective system of freedom of
expression discussed above require that similar protections be found.
As a result, courts in these states should interpret use of state tres-
pass statutes by private owners of public forums and residential com-
munities as state action sufficient to invoke the protection of the
state constitutional guarantee of free speech.88 Although the Four-
teenth Amendment does not embody this conception of state action,8 9
86. 3 Wash. App. 833, 846, 478 P.2d 792, 799, appeal denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971).
Both Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 370 Mich. 547,
122 N.W.2d 785 (1963), and Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833,
478 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1971), appeal denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971), are also based on
First Amendment reasoning that the Supreme Court has now rejected. For example, the
evenly divided Michigan Supreme Court analogized the shopping center to the business
block of the privately held municipality in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See
370 Mich. at 563-71, 122 N.W.2d at 793-98. Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals
relied primarily upon Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). See 3 Wash. App. at 836-48, 478 P.2d
at 794-800. The free speech guarantee of the Washington Constitution was mentioned
only cursorily. Id. at 846, 478 P.2d at 799. Both courts decided these cases prior to the
Court's removal of the First Amendment from the private abridgment field. Such pro-
tection against private abridgment now rests exclusively upon the state constitutional
guarantees of free speech as both the California, see Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd sub non. PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980), and New Jersey, see Freedman v. New
Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975), courts have held. Courts in
California, see Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907-08, 592 P.2d "41,
345, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1979), afI'd sub non. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,
100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980), and Washington, see Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center,
3 Wash. App. 833, 846, 478 P.2d 792, 799, appeal denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971), have
also construed the signature-gathering elements of the related state constitutional guar-
antees of initiative, referendum, and recall to protect signature gathering in shopping
centers.
87. See HAwAnI CONsT. art. I, § 4; IND. Co NsT. art. I, § 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 2; UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
88. The only case that has arisen thus far under the state governmental abridgment
guarantees, see note 87 supra, is Lenrich Assoc. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972).
The Lenrich Associates court based its refusal to protect expressive activity against shop.
ping center abridgment on the basis of a reading of the Fifth Amendment, id. at 127-29,
504 P.2d at 115-16, that the Supreme Court has now held to be incorrect, see PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980). But cf. 264 Or. at 135-37, 504 P.2d at
119 (O'Connell, C.J., dissenting) (shopping center essentially a public place, thus expres-
sive activity therein protected under Oregon free speech guarantee).
89. See pp. 172-74 supra.
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state courts are free to use a more inclusive conception to enforce
their state constitutional guarantees. 90 Indeed, state courts are the
most appropriate judicial institution for this task, because both the
public interest in general speech 91 and individual property rights
92
are defined exclusively under state law. Use of an inclusive con-
ception of state action by these courts would insure that public forum
and canvassing rights are equally protected from private as well as
governmental abridgment.
C. The Scope of State Constitutional Protection
Against Private Abridgment of Speech
Under the speech protection scheme outlined in this Note, expres-
sive activity on all types of private property would theoretically be
accorded state constitutional protection. This protection, however,
should not be viewed as absolute. State constitutional protection of
expressive activity against private abridgment should, like federal
constitutional protection against governmental abridgment, be lim-
ited by consideration of time, place, and manner of exercise.
First Amendment doctrine in the governmental abridgment area
provides an apt parallel. It is constitutional maxim that although
governments may not absolutely prohibit the exercise of public forum
and canvassing rights, they may subject their exercise to reasonable
regulation as to time, place, and manner.93 This principle allows
governments to bar absolutely expressive activity from publicly held
property when that activity would be incompatible with the use to
which the property was dedicated. 94 Moreover, even when a person
90. See Project Report, supra note 1, at 297-301 (similar proposal).
91. A person's interest in protection of his speech against private abridgment is, like
his interest in reputation, "simply one of a number which the State may protect against
injury by virtue of its . . . law." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
92. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (dictum) (protection of a
person's general interest in property, life, and privacy left largely to law of individual
states). See also p. 178 supra.
93. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1943) (dictum) (govern-
ments may constitutionally regulate door-to-door canvassing in order to protect privacy
of individual householders and prevent criminal acts by persons posing as canvassers).
94. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (Court to inquire whether
manner of expression is basically incompatible with normal activity of particular place).
Compare Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (state precluded from prevent-
ing demonstration on state capitol grounds traditionally open to public) with Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (state could prevent demonstration on jailhouse grounds
closed to public for security reasons) and Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military
base commander may bar handbilling because it would interfere with traditional insula-
tion of military activities from partisan political campaigns). Even the dissenters in cases
refusing to protect expressive activity recognize that governments may constitutionally
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is exercising a First Amendment speech right, he may be subjected
to manner and time regulations designed to prevent interference
with governmental functions being performed on public property9"
or with other social interests.96 Thus, nothing in the First Amend-
ment requires either that the publicly held private office of the
President be opened to expressive activity, 97 or that expressive ac-
tivity trample on other social interests.
A similar principle should be articulated for privately held prop-
erty subject to state constitutional protection of speech. It would
be premised upon federal constitutional protection of privacy in the
home9" as well as upon state constitutional limitations on rights of
expression that would parallel those that exist under the First
Amendment. Thus, nothing in any state constitutional guarantee of
free speech would require either that the living room of a private
home be opened to expressive activity,9 9 or that expressive activity
trample on other interests of property owners.
1. Place
State courts should develop a test that determines in which situa-
tions private abridgment must yield to expressive activity. In a
series of cases dealing with expressive activity on private property,
bar such activity from some types of publicly held property. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (some public places may be so clearly
committed to other purposes that use for expressive activity is anomalous).
95. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965) (government could constitutionally
prohibit picketing "in or near" courthouse that had "the intent of interfering with, ob-
structing, or impeding the administration of justice").
96. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1943) (dictum) (governments
may constitutionally regulate door-to-door canvassing in order to protect privacy of indi-
vidual householders and prevent criminal acts by persons posing as canvassers).
97. This apocryphal example is found in T. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 304.
98. A number of recent Supreme Court decisions appear to cluster around a personal
right of privacy in the home. The leading case is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (marital privacy protected against statute prohibiting use of contraceptives). See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) to
racially discriminatory admissions policy of private school does not represent governmental
intrusion into privacy of home or similarly intimate setting); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969) (private possession of obscene material in one's home protected
against state statute proscribing possession of obscene material). Moreover, many commen-
tators who have urged the abolition or relaxation of the "state action" concept at the
federal constitutional level contend that federally protected privacy rights will emerge
as effective limitations on Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Black, The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposi-
tion 14, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 69, 100-03 (1967).
99. This apocryphal example was discussed by Justices Powell and White in their con-
currence in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2050-51 n.4 (1980).
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the California courts have formulated such a test.100 As explicated
in In re Hoffman,1' 1 it requires that, on properties open to the pub-
lic, expressive activity be permitted as long as it does not interfere
with private use of that property.'0 2 Under this test, expressive ac-
tivity may not be restricted inside a privately held shopping cen-
ter,10 3 but may inside a company park maintained exclusively for
employee use. 10 4 Similarly, expressive activity must be permitted in-
side a privately held passenger railway station, 05 but not in the pay
parking lot of Disneyland where it interferes with the operation of
the amusement park's monorail trams. 10
6
Although this test is quite appropriate for determining when pri-
vate abridgment must yield to the exercise of public forum rights,
it is not appropriate for determining when it must yield to the ex-
ercise of canvassing rights, because many private properties that con-
tain residential communities are not in fact open to the public.
07
100. Although these holdings were premised upon a now discarded reading of the
First Amendment, see, e.g., In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 850, 434 P.2d 353, 355-56, 64
Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967) (First Amendment can protect expressive activity in privately
held railway station), the California Supreme Court has recently upheld them as inter-
pretations of the state constitutional guarantee of free speech. See Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-10, 592 P.2d 341, 346-47, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60
(1979), aff'd sub nom. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. CL 2035 (1980).
101. 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
102. Thus, the owners of a passenger railway station were precluded from abridging
handbilling because they sought "neither privacy within nor exclusive possession of their
station," id. at 851, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (station open to public for pas-
senger railway use as well as purchases from magazine stand, restaurant, cocktail lounge
and snack bar on premises, and use of waiting room, id. at 847, 434 P.2d at 354, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 98) and expressive activity "in no way interfered with the use of the station"
by its owners, id. at 851, 434 P.2d at 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 101. A similar test was sug-
gested by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186-89
(1976), for determining the type of private contracts proscribed by the prohibition of
private racial discrimination embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
103. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd sub norn. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035
(1980); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792, appeal
denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shop-
ping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (affirming lower court by equally
divided vote).
104. Cf. Good v. Dow Chemical, 247 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (claim of public
access rejected because company park constituted undedicated private property).
105. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
106. In re Ball, 23 Cal. App. 3d 380, 100 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Ct. App. 1972).
107. The situation was aptly described by the court in State v. Kolcz, 114 N.J. Super.
408, 410, 276 A.2d 595, 596 (Middlesex County Ct. 1971): "Rossmoor [Community, described
by the court as a "planned retirement village," id. at 409, 276 A.2d at 596] is, apparently,
in part surrounded by a wall and there are gates with security guards." However, if
owners of these facilities are allowed to avoid public access rights by simply closing off
the premises to outsiders, the canvassing right of the expression system will be denied to
significant numbers of persons. See id. at 416, 276 A.2d at 600 (to allow owner abridgment
of canvassing would create political isolation booth).
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When canvassing rights are at issue, the Hoffman public forum
test'08 should be replaced by a requirement that canvassing be per-
mitted where a property owner exercises control over passageways
connecting individual housing units.10 9 Any conflict between can-
vassing rights and the commercial and residential needs of the prop-
erty owner must be balanced through time and manner regulations
rather than through a wholesale abridgment of canvassing.
2. Manner and Time
State courts should also develop a test to determine the permis-
sible scope of time and manner regulation by property owners
required by state constitutional guarantees of free speech to permit
expressive activity on their premises. First Amendment doctrine in
the governmental abridgment area would provide an appropriate
starting point."10
As the California"' and Washington ' 2 courts have recognized, own-
ers of private properties that function as public forums should be
allowed to regulate expressive activity on their property in order
to insure that it does not interfere with the commercial functions to
which the property is dedicated. Here, the position of the public
forum owner is identical to that of the government as the court-
house administrator in Cox v. Louisiana.1 3 Thus, owners might be
allowed to limit expressive activity to a particular area of property.
114
Owners might also be allowed to proscribe expressive activity that,
although consistent with the dedicated uses of other properties, would
interfere with the particular use to which their property was put."
5
108. See p. 185 supra.
109. See note 60 supra (similar standard in Minnesota statute protecting canvassing
rights against private abridgment).
110. See p. 184 supra.
111. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911, 592 P.2d 341, 347-48,
153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1979), af 'd sub norn. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,
100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
112. See Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 833, 847, 478 P.2d
792, 800, appeal denied, 79 Wash. 2d 1005 (1971).
113. 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965) (government could constitutionally prohibit courthouse
picketing that has intent of interfering with administration of justice).
114. A shopping center trade association has suggested that owners "might create a
'public street' or 'free-speech area' within the center complex" if no other forums were
available nearby. Eagle, supra note 13, at 645 nA12 (quoting ICSC LEGAL BULL., Feb. 1973,
at 1 (publication of International Council of Shopping Centers)). This was written before
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), removed First Amendment considerations from
this field.
115. The trial court in Lenrich Assoc. v. Heyda, Civ. No. 373-433 (Cir. Ct. Multnomah
County, Or., Mar. 23, 1972), rev'd, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972), specifically proscribed
noise so loud as to create a nuisance. The expressive activity in Lenrich Associates was en-
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This is consistent with the power of municipalities to protect their
citizens from expressive nuisances. 1 6 Courts should insure, however,
that owners of privately held public forums do not use these powers
to evade their state constitutional obligations.
1 17
Similarly, owners of property who are required to permit can-
vassing on the premises should be allowed to regulate this expres-
sive activity in order to protect the privacy" ls and security" 9 in-
terests of residents of the property. Thus, individual residents should
be allowed to post signs that prevent canvassers from attempting to
contact the residents of particular housing units, and owners should
be allowed to expel canvassers who ignore these warnings.' 20 This
privacy interest would not extend beyond the door of a particular
housing unit into the privately held passageways connecting individual
units, however, because a privacy interest cannot be asserted in these
quasi-public passageways travelled by neighboring residents and their
visitors.'12
Residents and owners, however, do have a security interest in pre-
vention of crime in the passageways and other areas of residential
community, similar to the crime prevention interest shared by a
municipality and its citizens. To this end, owners should be al-
gaged in by members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness. They were
also prohibited from conducting religious services, burning incense, parading, chanting,
or making music. They were limited to literature distribution and discussion of their
religion. See Recent Cases, supra note 75, at 1593 & n.2.
116. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting use of "loud and raucous" sound amplifiers).
117. The Court has consistently held that municipalities have the power to require
users of their public forums to secure a permit before engaging in expressive activity
therein. These requirements, however, must be administered in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner with attention focused exclusively upon traffic control and not upon the content of
any proposed activity. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
118. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943) (dictum) (municipalities
free to prosecute individuals who remain on householder's property after being warned
away).
119. Many jurisdictions now hold apartment complex owners liable for negligence that
causes their tenants to suffer criminal acts while on the premises. See, e.g., Johnston v.
Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
120. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943) (dictum) (municipalities
may prosecute canvassers who ignore posted warnings).
121. In this context, the privacy interest at stake is the "right to be let alone." See War-
ren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). This right can only
be asserted inside a physical enclosure to which entry by others is absolutely barred, and
is irrelevant in a setting regularly traversed by other persons. The Court has rejected
other asserted privacy interests. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975) (privacy of passersby not invaded by observing nude scenes on quite visible drive-in
theater screen); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (privacy of passers-by not invaded
by offensive insignia worn on jacket in public place); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952) (privacy of passengers not infringed by radio played on bus).
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lowed to require canvassers to show or wear identification, 12 2 and
to register as they enter and exit the premises.12 3 Finally, the owner
should also be allowed to insure that canvassing does not interfere




Cases in which state constitutional guarantees of free speech have
been used to redress private abridgment, although few and not al-
ways clear,127 represent an important part of the trend away from
exclusive reliance on the federal Constitution to protect civil lib-
erties. 128 These decisions will move the system of freedom of ex-
pression into a new period of federalism in which the state consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech play a role complementary to that
of the First Amendment in protecting the vital public forum and
canvassing components of the system of freedom of expression.
122. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (dictum) (city can require
canvassers to wear identification devices).
123. In Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court struck down as un-
constitutionally vague a municipal ordinance requiring canvassers to give written notice
to the local police department before canvassing. The Court stated, however, that a
narrowly drawn ordinance that did not vest in municipal officials the undefined power
to determine what residents will hear or see would be constitutional. rd. at 617. A re-
quirement that canvassers register with the owner or resident manager of the property
as they enter and exit the premises would serve the owner's interest in crime prevention
without hazarding the problems that rendered the ordinance in Hynes unconstitutional.
124. In Freedman v. New Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975),
the court held that persons granted access to an agricultural labor camp could visit its
residents only during nonworking hours, because "the farmer ought not to be com-
pelled to sit by and have his production disrupted." Id. at 302, 343 A.2d at 151. Similarly,
visitors must confine themselves to the area where the camp residents live and work. Id.
Finally, the court held that visitors must give "reasonable notice" to the camp owner,
id., although it did not elaborate on the specific content of this requirement. However,
the presence of commercial activity on the closed premises might justify a notice require-
ment that would be unnecessary in the context of a purely residential multiple housing
unit community, such as an apartment complex.
125. The Minnesota canvassing statute, see note 60 supra, allows nursing home owners
to deny permission to visit certain persons where valid reasons of health exist. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 210A.43(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979).
126. The owner should also be allowed to insure that canvassing is carried out in a
quiet and orderly manner.
127. For example, it is unclear whether New Jersey's proscription of private abridg-
ment of canvassing is based on common law or the free speech guarantee in the state
constitution. Compare State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971), with Freedman v.
New Jersey State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975).
128. For a good overview of state developments in a number of fields, see Project
Report, supra note 1.
